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The social component of the projection behavior of clausal complement contents
Taylor Mahler ∗
Abstract. Some accounts of presupposition projection predict that content’s con-
sistency with the Common Ground influences whether it projects (e.g., Heim 1983;
Gazdar 1979a,b). I conducted an experiment to test whether Common Ground
information about the speaker’s social identity influences projection of clausal
complement contents (CCs). Participants rated the projection of CCs conveying
stereotypical liberal or conservative political positions when the speaker was either
Democrat- or Republican-affiliated. As expected, CCs were more projective when
they conveyed political positions consistent with the speaker’s political affiliation:
liberal CCs were more projective with Democrat compared to Republican speakers,
and conservative CCs were more projective with Republican compared to Demo-
crat speakers. In addition, CCs associated with factive predicates (e.g., know) were
more projective than those associated with non-factive predicates (e.g., believe).
These findings suggest that social meaning influences projective meaning and that
social meaning is constrained by semantic meaning, in line with previous research
on the relation between other levels of linguistic structure/perception and social
information.
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1. Introduction. When speakers presuppose content, they often convey their commitment to
its truth even when the content is not entailed. Consider the content of the complement (hence-
forth CC) of know in (1), i.e., Obama improved the American economy. In each sentence, the
complement of know is embedded within the syntactic scope of an entailment-cancelling oper-
ator: negation in (1-a), a question in (1-b), an epistemic modal in (1-c), and an antecedent of a
conditional in (1-d). Nevertheless, the sentences in (1) permit readings on which the speaker is
taken to be committed to truth of the CC of know. Content that displays such behavior is said
to project (e.g., Kiparsky & Kiparsky 1970; Karttunen 1971): despite being expressed by a
constituent that is embedded within the scope of an entailment-cancelling operator, the speaker
can be taken to be committed to the content’s truth.
(1) a. Cindy doesn’t know that Obama improved the American economy.
b. Does Cindy know that Obama improved the American economy.
c. Cindy might know that Obama improved the American economy.
d. If Cindy knows that Obama improved the American economy, she’ll vote for him.
The ability to project has historically been regarded as the defining property of presuppo-
sition. Hence, the classical answer to the question of why content projects is that it is presup-
posed (e.g., Heim 1983, 1992; van der Sandt 1992).
Clause-embedding predicates are often assumed to divide into two classes depending on
whether they lexically encode the presupposition of their complements: factive predicates like
know encode this presupposition, whereas non-factive predicates like think and believe do not
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(Kiparsky & Kiparsky 1970). On such lexically-based accounts of presupposition, presupposi-
tions project unless they conflict with other information in the Common Ground (Heim 1983;
Gazdar 1979a,b; van der Sandt 1992). Thus, in the absence of information that conflicts with
with the CC of know in (1), these accounts predict that the CC projects.
Other approaches derive (at least some cases of) presupposition projection from general
pragmatic principles (e.g., Stalnaker 1974; Boe¨r & Lycan 1976; Karttunen & Peters 1979; Si-
mons 2001, 2005; Abrusa´n 2011). A prominent and well-developed approach within this camp
has proposed that information-structural properties of utterances predict projection behavior
(e.g., Abbott 2000; Simons 2001, 2007; Simons et al. 2010, 2017; Beaver et al. 2017; Ton-
hauser et al. 2018). Proponents of this approach hypothesize that whether content projects de-
pends on whether it is at-issue in the discourse. Content that addresses the Question Under
Discussion (QUD; Roberts 1996/2012) is at-issue and predicted to be non-projective. Con-
tent that does not address the QUD is not-at-issue and predicted to project. For example, when
(1-a) is uttered in a context in which the QUD is Did Obama improve the American economy?,
the CC of know is predicted not to project since it addresses the QUD and is hence at-issue.
When the same sentence is uttered in a context in which the QUD is What cognitive relation
does Ben have to the proposition that Obama improved the American economy?, the CC of know
is predicted to project since it does not address the QUD and is hence not-at-issue.
These approaches highlight two different properties of content that have been implicated
in projection: consistency with the Common Ground and at-issueness. As Beaver et al. (2017)
point out, these properties are related: content that is entailed by, and hence consistent with,
the Common Ground is not-at-issue and predicted to project.
However, content that is not entailed by the Common Ground may be either at-issue or
not-at-issue, depending on the QUD. It is possible that the projection of content not entailed
by the Common Ground is influenced by both Common Ground consistency and the QUD/at-
issueness, or that these properties influence one another. Here, I focus on the former of these
two properties in isolation, leaving for future research the task of determining their relation to
each other and to the projection of content that is not entailed by the Common Ground.
In investigating the property of Common Ground consistency, the current study builds on
research from Tonhauser & Degen (2019), who manipulated the CC’s consistency with the
Common Ground by providing information relevant to the truth of the CC. Tonhauser & De-
gen (2019) found that the CC is more projective when it is highly probable by virtue of the
Common Ground information compared to when it is less probable, suggesting that incon-
sistency with the Common Ground interferes with projection. The primary goal of the cur-
rent study is to investigate whether consistency with a particular type of Common Ground in-
formation – social information about the speaker – influences CC projection. A second goal
is to investigate whether these (in)consistencies are dependent on the factivity of the clause-
embedding predicate. These two aims are articulated in the research questions in (2):
(2) Research Questions:
a. For clausal complement contents (CCs), is projection sensitive to consistency be-
tween the contents and Common Ground information about the speaker’s social
identity?
b. Is the effect of consistency dependent on the factivity of the clause-embedding pred-
icate?
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I explore these research questions on the basis of an experiment in which participants were
presented with target sentences like (1-a). Consistency between the CC and Common Ground
information about the speaker’s social identity was operationalized by manipulating two vari-
ables, as demonstrated in (3). The lexical content instantiating the clausal complement was
manipulated such that it conveyed either a liberal political position (Obama improved the Amer-
ican economy) or a conservative political position (Obama damaged the American economy).
The speaker’s political affiliation was manipulated by presenting each sentence as the utterance
of either a Republican or Democrat-affiliated speaker.
(3) Cindy doesn’t {know/believe} that Obama {improved, damaged} the American economy.
If consistency with Common Ground social information influences projection, CCs that are
consistent with liberal ideologies will project more with Democrat speakers and CCs that are
consistent with conservative ideologies will project more with Republican speakers, compared
to when the speaker is affiliated with the opposing party.
In order to address the second research question, the factivity of the clause-embedding
predicates was also manipulated. Each lexical content was presented as the complement of
one factive predicate like know and one non-factive predicate like believe. If projection is a
consequence of lexically-encoded presupposition, as assumed by lexically-based accounts of
projection, then factivity should influence the projection of CCs. Specifically, the CCs of fac-
tive predicates should be more projective than those of non-factive predicates, and may also
constrain the effect of Common Ground consistency on projection.
2. Accounting for projection behavior: existing accounts. Lexically-based analyses of pro-
jection start with the assumption that projection is a consequence of lexically-encoded pre-
supposition (e.g., Karttunen 1974; Heim 1983, 1992; Gazdar 1979a,b; van der Sandt 1992;
Schlenker 2008). Presuppositions are then subject to a requirement with respect to the Com-
mon Ground: the presupposition must be entailed by (Heim 1983) or satisfied in the Common
Ground (van der Sandt 1992). In the simplest case, the presupposition is already part of the
Common Ground, i.e, the speaker and addressee already have mutual knowledge of the pre-
supposed information. If the presupposition is not already in the Common Ground but the
speaker’s utterance is nevertheless felicitous, the addressee simply adds the presupposed in-
formation to the Common Ground. This process is called global accommodation (e.g., Heim
1983). In both cases, the speaker is interpreted as having expressed commitment to the truth of
the presupposition by taking it to be in the Common Ground, i.e., the presupposition is felt to
project to the Common Ground of the interlocutors.
Among the presupposition “triggers” that have been claimed to lexically-encode presup-
positions are a subset of clause-embedding predicates called factives (Kiparsky & Kiparsky
1970). Kiparsky & Kiparsky (1970) distinguished factive predicates like regret, know and re-
alize from non-factive predicates on the basis of both syntactic and semantic properties, but
semantically they were differentiated on the basis of the presupposition of the CC. Whereas
factive predicates are assumed to lexically encode their CCs as presuppositions, non-factive
predicates are not. Projection then follows from presupposition: the CCs of factives are pre-
dicted to project, in contrast to those of non-factives.
As many observations in the literature attest, the CCs of factive predicates do not always
project. Just one year after Kiparsky & Kiparsky (1970) introduced the factive/non-factive di-
779
vision, Karttunen (1971) pointed out that some factives (e.g., regret) seem to allow only pro-
jective interpretations, whereas others like discover admit both projective and non-projective
interpretations. To capture this difference, he coined the term semi-factive for predicates like
discover that can exhibit variable projection behavior, distinguishing them from predicates like
regret that do not.
Factive presuppositions can also fail to project when they conflict with other contextual in-
formation. Simons (2001), following comments from Geurts (1999) and Chierchia & McConnell-
Ginet (1990), pointed out that factive presuppositions do not project in “explicit ignorance
contexts”. She offers the example in (4), in which the CC of discover is embedded under the
entailment-cancelling epistemic modal adverb perhaps.
(4) [Context: At a restaurant, the interlocutors observe a couple arguing at another table.]
Speaker: Perhaps she just discovered that he’s having an affair.
Since neither interlocutor is acquainted with the couple, the addressee believes that the speaker
has no knowledge of the man’s behaviors. Hence, the addressee does not take the speaker to
be committed to the CC of discover. Instead, the addressee interprets the speaker as suggesting
that it is possible that he had an affair, and that if he has had one her discovery of it may be
the reason for the argument.
The mechanism that is standardly invoked to account for the observation that presuppo-
sitions do not always project is local accommodation (Heim 1983). Central to this process
are the notions of global and local contexts (Karttunen 1974; Stalnaker 1974; Heim 1983).
An entire sentence is evaluated with respect to the information in the global context, i.e., the
Common Ground. But constituent sentences may instead be evaluated with respect to local
contexts, prior to updating the global context. In (4), the CC of discover could be locally ac-
commodated by being evaluated within the scope of the modal adverb. The speaker is then
interpreted as believing that the affair is a possibility, without being certain that it happened.
Others have proposed that presuppositions are simply cancelled when they conflict with
Common Ground information (e.g., Gazdar 1979a,b; van der Sandt 1988). Gazdar (1979a,b)
outlines an account in which presuppositions project by default, but are cancelled if they con-
flict with the speaker’s prior set of commitments. Presuppositions only project if they do not
conflict with prior speaker commitments contributed by implicatures, entailments, or other
extra-linguistic information. When such a conflict emerges, the presupposition does not project
to the Common Ground.
The approaches described thus far in this section assume that projection is a consequence
of presupposition. But other authors have pointed out that content need not be presupposed
in order to project (e.g., Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 1990; Potts 2005). For example, sev-
eral authors have noted based on examples like (5) from Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet (1990)
that appositive expressions contribute content that is not presupposed, and nevertheless projects
(Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 1990; Potts 2005): the speaker has not presupposed that Jill
lost something on her flight, but is nevertheless taken to be committed to this content.
(5) Jill, who lost something on the flight from Ithaca to New York, doesn’t like to travel by
train.
Intonation also seems to influence whether content projects. Beaver (2010), for example, pointed
out the CC of discover in (6) seems not to project when a constituent within the complement
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(e.g., plagiarized in (6)) is narrowly focused; when narrow focus is outside of the complement
(e.g., when discovers is focused), the sentence receives a projective reading with respect to the
CC. Later experimental work confirmed the intuition that prosody influences the projection of
factive CCs (Cummins & Rohde 2015; Tonhauser 2016; Dja¨rv & Bacovcin 2017).
(6) a. If the TA discovers that your work is PLAGIARIZED, I will be forced to notify the
dean.
b. If the TA DISCOVERS that your work is plagiarized, I will be forced to notify the
dean.
In light of observations like these, recent work has attempted to provide a unified analysis of
both presuppositional and non-presuppositional projective meanings in terms of information
structure (e.g., Simons et al. 2010; Beaver et al. 2017; Simons et al. 2017). At the core of this
analysis is Roberts’ (1996/2012) Question Under Discussion (QUD), i.e., the semantic question
corresponding to the current topic of discourse. In (7), for example, Rachel’s utterance could
be intended to address either QUD1 or QUD2.
(7) QUD1: What does the pizza have on it?
QUD2: What is Ben’s relation to the proposition the pizza has olives on it?
Rachel: Ben doesn’t know that the pizza has olives on it.
Whereas the CC addresses QUD1, it does not address QUD2. In their Projection Principle,
Beaver et al. (2017) hypothesized that this property of the CC predicts whether it projects:
content that addresses the QUD, at-issue content, is hypothesized not to project; content that
does not address the QUD, not-at-issue content, is hypothesized to project (see also Simons
et al. 2010, 2017).
Like the lexically-based accounts, the Projection Principle predicts that content that is en-
tailed by the Common Ground projects. Beaver et al. (2017) explain that this prediction fol-
lows from the assumption that the Common Ground and the QUD ought to be compatible with
one another. That is, the QUD should not be about the truth of the content that is entailed
by the Common Ground; hence content entailed by the Common Ground is not-at-issue, and
therefore projects.
But the Projection Principle and lexically-based accounts make different predictions about
the projection of content that is not entailed by the Common Ground. On the information-
structural accounts outlined above, the QUD determines whether the content is (not-)at-issue
and this property predicts whether it will project. On lexically-based accounts, however, only
content associated with a presupposition trigger has the potential to project, and it is predicted
to do so unless it conflicts with other information in the Common Ground.
The experiment reported in this paper is designed to investigate the projection of content
that is not entailed by the Common Ground, and whether its ability to project is sensitive to a
particular property: consistency with the Common Ground. Though the influence of this prop-
erty on projection is associated with lexically-based accounts of projection, it is in principle
possible that both Common Ground consistency and information-structural properties such as
at-issueness influence projection of content (i.e., content not entailed by the Common Ground).
This study is not intended to explore the interaction of these two properties, and leaves this
task to future research. However, I do consider the possibility that content may project even
when it is not associated with a canonical presupposition trigger, a possibility which is con-
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sistent with information-structural but not lexically-based projection accounts. In particular, I
investigate the extent to which consistency with the Common Ground influences the projection
of CCs associated with factive predicates – which are canonical presupposition triggers – as
well as non-factive predicates, which are not assumed by lexically-based accounts to encode
their complements as presuppositions.
3. Social and linguistic meaning. As discussed in section 2, consistency with the Common
Ground has been implicated as property of content that influences projection. Such Common
Ground information can come from a variety of sources - prior utterances, entailments or im-
plicatures of the uttered sentence, or implicit reasoning about the extralinguistic context (e.g.,
Heim 1983; Gazdar 1979a,b). In this paper, I investigate an aspect of the extralinguistic con-
text that hasn’t been explored in the projection literature: the speaker’s social identity.
The hypothesis that projection is sensitive to social information is motivated by robust evi-
dence from the sociolinguistic literature that linguistic structure and social information are inti-
mately connected in the minds of speakers/hearers. For example, listeners have been shown to
use information about speaker region (e.g., Niedzielski 1999; Hay & Drager 2010), age (e.g.,
Drager 2011) and gender (e.g., Strand 1999) in speech perception. D’Onofrio (2018) showed
that the speaker’s construction of a unique social personae (e.g., a valley girl or business pro-
fessional) influences the perception of the speaker’s vowels.
Social information has also been found to influence lexical access. A common experimen-
tal paradigm in this literature involves manipulating a speaker characteristic like age, as well as
the content of the sentence, such that the content is either congruent with the speaker charac-
teristic (e.g., an adult talking about drinking wine) or incongruent (e.g., a child talking about
drinking wine). In brain-imaging research, incongruent stimuli are associated with brain re-
sponses that are similar to the responses associated with other types of linguistic anomalies
(e.g., semantically anomalous words), leading researchers to conclude that the same sorts of
neural mechanisms underlie the processing of linguistic and social information (e.g., Van Berkum
et al. 2008; Tesink et al. 2009). In lexical access research that uses reaction time or offline de-
pendent measures, the processing of the word that creates the anomaly has been found to be
impeded (Kim 2016; Walker & Hay 2011; Choe et al. 2019). Casasanto (2008) implemented
a variation of the incongruity paradigm in which listeners were presented with pairs of spoken
sentences that were temporarily ambiguous between two interpretations. On one interpretation
the word of interest exhibited a feature of African American Vernacular English, a final /t/ or
/d/ that had been deleted (e.g., mast pronounced as [mæs]). In the other interpretation, there
was no underlying final stop (e.g., mass pronounced as [mæs]). Casasanto (2008) found that
participants responded faster to the sentence continuation that was compatible with the deleted
final stop interpretation when the speaker was black, and faster to the sentence continuation
that was compatible with there being no underlying final stop when the speaker was white.
Syntactic processing, too, has been shown to be sensitive to social information. In a brain
imaging study of native listeners, Hanulı´kova´ et al. (2012) found that gender-agreement viola-
tions in Dutch elicited a neural response associated with encountering ungrammaticality when
the speaker was native Dutch speaker, but not when the speaker was non-native. Similarly,
Seifeldin et al. (2015) found that native Standard American English (SAE) listeners’ neural
responses to copula deletion was modulated by the dialect of the speaker: the characteristic re-
sponse for ungrammaticality appeared for native SAE speakers, but not for native speakers of
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other English dialects.
Though research exploring the interface between social and semantic-pragmatic meaning
is sparse, a recent strand of scholarship has attempted to unify these two domains. Andrea Bel-
trama’s work focuses on the social and semantic-pragmatic meaning of linguistic expressions
conveying intensification and precision. With respect to intensifiers, he showed that totally has
greater potential to index social meaning when it targets a pragmatically-provided scale an-
chored to the speaker’s attitude (e.g., You should totally click on that link!) vs. a lexical scale
provided by the subsequent predicate (e.g., The bus is totally full.) (Beltrama & Staum Casasanto
2017; Beltrama 2018a). In other work, Beltrama (2018b) found that speakers who use more
precise expressions (e.g., Ben called at 9.03) are perceived as more intelligent, educated and ar-
ticulate but also more annoying, obsessive, pedantic and uptight than speaker who use less pre-
cise expressions (e.g., Ben called at 9). He interprets these finding as evidence that semantic-
pragmatic properties of expressions conveying linguistic intensification and precision constrain
their social meaning.
In addition to linguistic precision and intensification, determiners have also been the sub-
ject of research at the interface of semantic-pragmatic and social meaning. Acton & Potts
(2014) argued that the semantics of demonstrative determiners facilitates their ability to con-
vey social meaning; in particular speakers can use demonstratives to convey shared perspective
with their interlocutors. Acton (2019) further showed that the semantics of plural determiner
phrases (e.g., The Americans) allow speakers to express social distance from the addressee, in
contrast to bare plural phrases (e.g., Americans)
To summarize, there is robust evidence that social information influences linguistic pro-
cessing and perception at multiple levels of linguistic structure. However, within semantics and
pragmatics, research has focused on whether this relationship goes in the other direction, i.e.,
whether linguistic (semantic-pragmatic meaning) influences social perception. Here, I bring
these two lines of inquiry together by investigating whether semantic-pragmatic meaning – par-
ticularly projective meaning – is influenced by social information. Further, in light of the prior
research showing that semantic meaning constrains social perception, I explore the extent to
which the effect of social information on projection is mediated by lexical semantics, specifi-
cally the factivity of clause-embedding predicates.
4. Experiment. The projective contents explored in the experiment were the contents ex-
pressed by the complements of clause-embedding predicates. (In)consistency between the CC
and the Common Ground was operationalized by manipulating the political orientation of the
lexical content instantiating the clausal complement (conservative vs. liberal) and the polit-
ical affiliation of the speaker (Republican vs. Democrat). Factivity of the clause-embedding
predicate was manipulated by presenting each lexical content as the complement of a factive
predicate and a non-factive predicate.
Participants provided projection ratings for the same stimuli in two separate experimental
blocks, one in which the speaker was Republican-affiliated and one in which the speaker was
Democrat-affiliated. Projectivity was measured using the ‘certainty’ diagnostic (e.g., Tonhauser
2016; Stevens et al. 2017; Tonhauser et al. 2018). This diagnostic assesses speaker commit-
ment by asking participants to indicate the extent to which the speaker is certain about the
content of interest.
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4.1. PARTICIPANTS. 200 participants were recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform
and paid $1.25 for participating in the experiment.1 Participants had US IP addresses and at
least 97% of previous HITs approved. Data from non-native American English speakers (N=5)
and participants who responded incorrectly to control items (N=46) was removed, leaving data
from 149 participants.
4.2. MATERIALS. Each target sentence featured a third-person matrix subject, a clause-embedding
predicate, and a clausal complement. The predicate and complement were embedded under
negation, as in (8).
(8) Cindy doesn’t know that
a. Obama damaged the American economy. conservative CC
b. Obama improved the American economy. liberal CC
c. club membership numbers have increased. neutral CC
Seven clause-embedding predicates were used to construct the target sentences: the factive
predicates know, realize and see and the non-factive predicates believe, think and feel.
The clausal complements were instantiated by 42 lexical contents. 28 of these were “polit-
ical” lexical contents that conveyed a position regarding 1 of 14 political topics (e.g., Obama,
marriage equality etc.). For each topic, one lexical content conveyed a stereotypical liberal po-
sitions and one conveyed a stereotypical conservative position. These lexical contents were
normed in a separate experiment to ensure that they were associated with the intended political
orientation.2
The other 14 lexical contents were each associated with 1 “neutral” topic. These topics
were unrelated to politics (e.g., club membership numbers). The neutral topics were included
in order to confirm that the CCs in sentences uttered by Democrats were not perceived as more
projective than Republicans, or vice versa. Participants might have preexisting beliefs that af-
filiates of one political party are more certain about their claims than the affiliates of the other
party. If this were the case, observed differences in projectivity could be driven by this pre-
existing belief, rather than interactions between social information and the CC. If participants
don’t hold this preexisting belief, then the projection of neutral CCs should be equivalent re-
gardless of whether the speaker is Democrat- or Republican-affiliated.
Each lexical content was combined with 2 predicates (1 factive and 1 non-factive in most
cases). For political topics, the conservative and liberal lexical contents were each combined
with the same predicate. In total, there were 84 predicate/lexical content pairs, which were
used to construct 84 target sentences.
Target stimuli were constructed by presenting each target sentence once as the utterance
of a speaker attending a meeting College Democrats, and once as the utterance of a speaker
attending a meeting of College Republicans, as in (9).
(9) a. Republican speaker, conservative CC
Cindy, at the College Republicans Club meeting:
Ben doesn’t {know/believe} that Obama damaged the American economy.
b. Democrat speaker, conservative CC
1 The experiment was conducted with IRB approval.
2 See http://github.com/taylor5768/QP2-Social-meaning-and-projection for the all experimental materials, including
the materials used in the norming experiment
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Cindy, at the College Democrats Club meeting:
Ben doesn’t {know/believe} that Obama damaged the American economy.
c. Republican speaker, liberal CC
Cindy, College Republicans Club meeting:
Ben doesn’t {know/believe} that Obama improved the American economy.
d. Democrat speaker, liberal CC
Cindy, at the College Democrats Club meeting:
Ben doesn’t {know/believe} that Obama improved the American economy.
The 84 target sentences were distributed across 4 presentation lists. On each list, there were 14
target sentences with complements instantiated by politically-oriented lexical contents (“polit-
ical target sentences”) and 7 target sentences with complements instantiated by neutral lexical
contents (“neutral target sentences”). Each target sentence was presented once as the utterance
of a Republican-affiliated speaker and once as the utterance of a Democrat-affiliated speaker.
Each list included exactly three target sentences per predicate and no more than one target sen-
tence per topic. For half of the 14 political target sentences on each list, the complements were
instantiated by conservative lexical contents; the complements of the other political target sen-
tences were instantiated by liberal lexical contents.
In order to assess whether participants were paying attention, two control lexical contents
were also constructed. These lexical contents were apolitical, and expressed by main clauses
that were not embedded under entailment-cancelling operators, as in (10). They were therefore
expected to be interpreted as commitments of the speaker and receive high certainty ratings re-
gardless of the type of meeting attended by the speaker. Each control lexical content appeared
on each list twice, once as the utterance of a Democrat-affiliated speaker and once as the ut-
terance of a Republican-affiliated speaker. In total, there were 46 stimuli on each list. A short
demographic questionnaire was also included in which participants provided standard demo-
graphic information (age, native language. etc.) as well as information about their own politi-
cal affiliation.
(10) a. Carly, at the College Democrats Club meeting:
Alan brought the cookies for dessert.
b. Larry, at the College Democrats Club meeting:
Olivia missed the meeting because she’s sick.
4.3. PROCEDURE. Each participant was randomly assigned to 1 of the 4 presentation lists.
Participants completed the experiment in two separate experimental blocks. At the beginning
of each block, participants were told to imagine a meeting at a university campus. In one block,
they were told to imagine a meeting of the College Republicans Club. In the other block, they
were told to imagine a meeting of the College Democrats club. In the Republican block, par-
ticipants saw the 23 stimuli on their list with Republican speakers. In the Democrat block, they
saw the 23 stimuli on their list with Democrat speakers. Block order and within-block trial or-
der were randomized.
On each target stimulus trial, participants read the the speaker’s utterance followed by a
response question about the speaker’s certainty with respect to the CC, as shown in Figure 1.
Participants gave their responses by adjusting a slider labeled on the left with “No, not certain”
(corresponding to a rating of 0) and on the right with “Yes, certain” (corresponding to a rating
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of 1). The higher the response, the more projective the CC was taken to be.
The response question for the control stimuli was about the main clause content (Is Carly
certain that Alan brought the cookies for dessert? and Is Larry certain that Olivia missed the
meeting because she’s sick?).3 After completing both blocks of the experiment, participants
completed a demographic questionnaire.
Figure 1. Sample trial in the main experiment
4.4. RESULTS. The experiment was designed to address the research questions in (2). In this
section, I report the experimental results that bear on these questions. First, I confirm that the
projectivity of the stimuli with neutral CCs was not sensitive to the political affiliation of the
speaker. Second, I report the results for the stimuli with political CCs. These results suggest
that both the factivity of the clause-embedding predicate and the speaker’s political affiliation
independently influenced CC projection.
The responses to stimuli with neutral CCs were analyzed with a linear mixed-effects model.
The full model included fixed effects for predicate factivity (factive vs. non-factive), the polit-
ical affiliation of the speaker (Republican vs. Democrat), and their interaction. The maximal
random effects structure for which the model converged included random intercepts for item
and participant. p-values for fixed effects were obtained using log-likelihood comparisons be-
tween the full model against a model without the effect in question.
The fixed effect of predicate factivity was significant, such that the CCs of factive predi-
cates received higher ratings than those of non-factive predicates (β = 0.28, SE = 0.03, t =
10.98, χ2(1) = 50.05, p < 0.0001). The fixed effect of speaker political affiliation was not sig-
nificant (β = 0.003, SE = 0.01, t = 0.20, χ2(1) = 0.56, p = 0.46), nor was the interaction
fixed effect (β = .01, SE = 0.02, t = 0.37, χ2(1) = 0.56, p = 0.71). This suggests that partici-
pants did not have preexisting beliefs that speakers affiliated with a particular party were more
certain about their claims.
The responses to stimuli with political CCs were analyzed with a linear mixed-effects
model. The full model included fixed effects for predicate factivity (factive vs. non-factive),
the political affiliation of the speaker (Republican vs. Democrat), and the political orientation
of the CC (conservative vs. liberal) and all 3- and 2-way interactions. The maximal random
effects structure for which the model converged included random intercepts for item and par-
ticipant, as well as by-item and by-participant slopes for speaker political affiliation and the
political orientation of the CC. p-values for fixed-effects were obtained using log-likelihood
comparisons between the full model against a model without the effect in question.
3 Responses less than .6 on the rating scale were considered incorrect.
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Figure 2 visualizes mean ratings as a function of speaker political affiliation and politi-
cal orientation of the CC, grouped according to the factivity of the predicate. As suggested by
the figure, there was a significant interaction between the political orientation of the CC and
speaker’s affiliation (β = 0.19, SE = 0.15, t = 13.12, χ2(1) = 168.14, p < 0.0001). For clausal
complements instantiated by liberal lexical contents, ratings were higher when the speaker was
Democrat-affiliated (mean = .66) than Republican-affiliated (mean = .56). For clausal comple-
ments instantiated by conservative lexical contents, ratings were higher when the speaker was
Republican-affiliated (mean = .64) than Democrat-affiliated (mean =.55). The three-way inter-
action between political orientation, speaker affiliation, and predicate factivity did not reach
significance (β = 0.01, SE = 0.03, t = 0.39, χ2(1) = 0.15, p = 0.70).
Figure 3 visualizes mean ratings by predicate and factivity, suggesting that ratings were
higher when the predicate was factive (mean = 0.69) compared to when it was non-factive
(mean = 0.48). This qualitative observation was confirmed statistically: there was a signifi-
cant main effect of predicate factivity, such that the CCs of factive predicates received higher
ratings than those of non-factive predicates (β = 0.22, SE = 0.02, t = 9.99, χ2(1) = 40.66, p <
0.0001).
Figure 2. Mean projection ratings by
complement political orientation and speaker
affiliation (with 95% confidence intervals)
Figure 3. Mean projection ratings by
predicate for political items (with 95% confi-
dence intervals)
4.5. DISCUSSION. This experiment was designed to investigate the effects of two properties
on projection: (1) (in)consistency between projective content and Common Ground information
about the speaker’s social identity, and (2) the factivity of the clause embedding predicate.
As expected, CC projection was sensitive to consistency between the lexical contents in-
stantiating the complements and Common Ground information about the speaker’s social iden-
tity. Consistency between the lexical content instantiating the clausal complement and the
speaker’s social identity led to higher projection ratings than inconsistency: when the com-
plement was instantiated by a liberal lexical content, projection ratings were higher when the
speaker was Democrat; when the complement was instantiated by a conservative lexical con-
tent, projection ratings were higher when the speaker was Republican. This finding is com-
patible with accounts of projection that attribute non-projective interpretations of factive pre-
suppositions to local accommodation (e.g., Heim 1983) or cancellation (e.g., Gazdar 1979a,b;
van der Sandt 1992).
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This finding also demonstrates that the social identity of the speaker is an important source
of information about whether projective content is consistent with the Common Ground. Lis-
teners draw inferences about speaker beliefs based on information about the speaker’s social
identity and use these inferences to reason about whether content is consistent with the Com-
mon Ground; in short, social information influences projective meaning.
The factivity of the clause-embedding predicate was also found to influence projection, in-
dependently of whether the lexical content instantiating the complement was consistent with
the Common Ground information about the speaker’s social identity. CCs were more projec-
tive when the predicate was factive compared to when it was non-factive, regardless of the
speaker’s political affiliation. This finding is compatible with the assumption that factive predi-
cates lexically-encode their complements as presuppositions, whereas non-factive predicates do
not.
In sum, the findings of this experiment suggest that factivity and consistency with Com-
mon Ground information about the speaker’s social identity independently influence projection.
Common Ground (in)consistency can influence CC projection regardless of predicate factiv-
ity. However, such (in)consistency is not sufficient to override the effect of factivity, suggesting
that the semantics of the clause-embedding predicates constrain the effects of social informa-
tion.
5. Conclusion. Consistency between projective content and the Common Ground has previ-
ously been implicated as a property that influences projection (e.g., Heim 1983; van der Sandt
1992; Gazdar 1979a,b). In this paper, I investigated whether projection is sensitive to Common
Ground information about the speaker’s social identity. The findings suggest that such infor-
mation bears on how listeners reason about the consistency of the Common Ground with pro-
jective content: contents were more projective when they conveyed political positions consis-
tent with the speaker’s social identity than when they were not. Given that social information
has been found to influence comprehension/perception in many other linguistic domains, this
finding is expected and confirms that semantic-pragmatic meaning is also subject to influence
from such information. In addition, the finding that social information about the speaker did
not override the effects of the predicate’s factivity suggests that semantic meaning limits the
extent to which social information influences projective meaning, in line with prior research
showing that semantic-pragmatic meaning constrains social perception.
Together with recent work, the findings of this study highlight that social and semantic-
pragmatic meaning are more closely connected than often assumed, thereby motivating future
research at the interface of these two types of meaning. With respect to projective meaning,
an interesting question is whether less explicit cues to speaker social identity also influence
projection, for example, the use of sociolinguistic variants (e.g., -ing vs. -in). It remains for
future research to determine whether such cues also play a role, and how their effects ought to
be incorporated into a theory of projection.
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